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In a credence goods game with an expert and a consumer, we study experimentally the
impact of two devices that are predicted to induce consumer-friendly behavior if the
expert has a propensity to feel guilty when he believes that he violates the consumer’s
payoff expectations: (i) an opportunity for the expert to make a non-binding promise;
and (ii) an opportunity for the consumer to burn money. In belief-based guilt aversion
theory the ﬁrst opportunity shapes an expert’s behavior if an appropriate promise is made
and if it is expected to be believed by the consumer; by contrast, the second opportunity
might change behavior even though this option is never used along the predicted path.
Experimental results conﬁrm the behavioral relevance of (i) but fail to conﬁrm (ii).
© 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc.
1. Introduction
Goods and services where an expert seller knows more about the quality a consumer needs than the consumer herself
are called credence goods. While they have an uncommon name, these goods are consumed frequently. Examples include
car repair services, where the mechanic knows more about the type of service the vehicle needs than the owner; taxicab
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or medical treatments, where the doctor knows better which disease a patient has and which treatment is needed.
From the viewpoint of standard economic theory (relying on the assumption that all agents are rational, risk-neutral and
exclusively interested in their own material payoffs) eﬃciency in markets for credence goods is expected to be low for the
following reasons: If not restricted by institutional safeguards, such as liability clauses or ex post veriﬁability of actions,
experts will always provide a low quality service, even when consumers need a higher quality; and experts will ask for a
higher price than warranted by the provided service. The former type of fraud is known as undertreatment and the latter
type as overcharging. When consumers can judge the quality of service they get (without knowing whether the quality
received is the ex ante needed one, though), experts may also provide an unnecessarily high quality, which is referred to as
overtreatment (see Dulleck and Kerschbamer, 2006, for a survey of the theoretical literature).
Despite the monetary incentives for experts to defraud consumers, the turnover in markets for credence goods is huge.
For instance, the online site researchandmarkets.com reports that the U.S. auto repair industry comprises about 170,000
ﬁrms with combined annual revenues of $90 billion, of which 70% originates from mechanical repair. Likewise, health care
expenditures account for approximately 15% of GDP in the U.S. and are still rising (WHO World Health Statistics 2009).
In this paper, we examine in an experiment the inﬂuence of belief-shaping devices on the eﬃcient provision of credence
goods. While institutional safeguards against fraud (like liability) and market forces (like competition and the possibility to
build up a reputation) have been shown recently to increase eﬃciency on credence goods markets, the impact of “soft” fac-
tors such as non-binding promises has been ignored so far as possibly important for limiting undertreatment, overtreatment,
and overcharging, and thus contributing to the eﬃcient provision of credence goods.1
Soft factors such as non-binding promises have no effect on market behavior if all players are rational and only interested
in their own material payoff, and if this fact is common knowledge among players. However, if agents have belief-dependent
preferences, soft factors might become behaviorally relevant.
The point that belief-dependent motivations may be important for strategic decision making has ﬁrst been made by
Geanakoplos et al. (1989). They point out that traditional game theory is ill-equipped for studying such issues and develop
an extension – psychological game theory – to investigate the impact of belief-dependent motivations on behavior. Battigalli
and Dufwenberg (2009) generalize and extend the Geanakoplos et al. framework in several directions, thereby providing a
sound theoretical basis for the study of belief-dependent motivations in dynamic games.
This paper focuses on a speciﬁc kind of belief-dependent motivation, guilt aversion. Psychological guilt aversion – as
modeled by Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2007) – is the hypothesis that people feel guilty if they think that they violate
others’ payoff expectations. Its behavioral relevance is hard to prove empirically because a direct test of the theory requires
elicitation of second-order beliefs. This has been done in several previous studies (by Dufwenberg and Gneezy, 2000; Guerra
and Zizzo, 2004; Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006; Bacharach et al., 2007, for instance) and a typical ﬁnding has been
that there is a signiﬁcant positive correlation between stated second-order beliefs and behavior. This evidence is clearly
consistent with psychological guilt aversion theory. However, as several researchers have recently pointed out, it is also
consistent with other hypotheses, for instance with the consensus-effects hypothesis positing a reverse causality relationship
(from preferences and behavior to beliefs).2
This paper investigates the relevance of belief-dependent guilt aversion for eﬃciency on credence goods markets without
eliciting information about beliefs of players. Speciﬁcally, it tests the effects of two devices that are predicted to have
no impact on behavior if agents have standard preferences, but have the power to manipulate beliefs and are therefore
predicted to have an impact on behavior if players are guilt averse:
Device 1: Giving the expert an opportunity to make a promise. Though being cheap talk under the assumption of com-
mon knowledge that both parties are rational and exclusively interested in their own material payoffs, an opportunity to
make a promise might increase eﬃciency on credence goods markets if experts are guilt averse and believe that appro-
priate promises affect the payoff expectations of consumers. In this case appropriate promises affect second-order beliefs
and second-order beliefs affect behavior. The behavioral relevance of non-binding promises has been investigated before,
of course, for instance by Ellingsen and Johannesson (2004), Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) and Vanberg (2008).3 Our
novelty here is that, due to the nature of credence goods, promises can take three natural forms, each implying a particular
restraint on the expert’s behavior. In particular, there is (i) a promise to provide a suﬃcient quality that – if kept – acts
as a substitute for liability; (ii) a promise to charge the appropriate price for the quality provided that – if kept – acts
as a substitute for veriﬁability; and (iii) a promise to provide a suﬃcient quality and to charge the appropriate price for
1 See Dulleck et al. (2011) for a large experimental study on the effects of veriﬁability, liability, competition, and reputation on markets for credence
goods, and Huck et al. (2007, 2010, 2012) on the role of competition, reputation, and information exchange on markets for experience goods. For a
distinction of the different types of goods see Darby and Karni (1973).
2 This possibility has already been discussed by Charness and Dufwenberg (2006, p. 1594). Ellingsen et al. (2010) test the guilt aversion hypothesis in a
way that reduces the scope for consensus effects and ﬁnd almost no evidence supporting the behavioral relevance of belief-dependent motivations. They
conclude that previous ﬁndings to the contrary may be driven by consensus effects. Vanberg (2010) shows theoretically that rational belief formation
implies a correlation between preferences and beliefs (of any order) as long as preferences of players in the population are correlated. He concludes that
we should expect a correlation in experimental settings even if belief-dependent motivations are absent.
3 In the context of social dilemmas – where both players have dominant strategies to defect rather than cooperate – promises have also been found to
be eﬃciency-increasing. See Orbell et al. (1988), Ostrom (1998) or Dawes and Messick (2000), for instance.
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dimension, and their effectiveness on trade in credence goods markets.
Device 2: Giving the consumer an opportunity to burnmoney. Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2009, Proposition 12) have shown
that the presence of a money-burning option might be quite powerful when agents have belief-dependent motivations. Their
story is based on a psychological forward-induction argument and the idea that chosen and unchosen alternatives reveal
ﬁrst-order beliefs of the decision maker and thereby shape second-order beliefs of an observer. Since in psychological
guilt aversion theory second-order beliefs inﬂuence behavior, unchosen alternatives of one person might have an effect on
the behavior of another person. Here is a sketch of the argument (see Section 3 and Appendix A for details): Suppose
the consumer of a credence good has the opportunity to burn money before interacting with the expert and the amount
burned is communicated to the expert. Furthermore, suppose that the moderately guilt-averse expert knows that for a
rational consumer burning money is only a best reply if he has at least somewhat optimistic beliefs about the behavior of
the expert. Then, the observation that the consumer has burned money allows the expert to draw the inference that the
consumer has at least somewhat optimistic beliefs and this inference might induce him to behave in a consumer-friendly
manner. Moreover, by not burning money the consumer (anticipating consumer-friendly behavior in response to burning
money) conveys the belief that he expects to get even more. Thus, in the presence of a money-burning option simply
trading with the expert (without burning money) allows the expert to draw more exact inferences about the consumer’s
optimistic expectations than the same action allows in the absence of the money-burning option and might thereby induce
even a moderately guilt-averse expert to behave in a consumer-friendly manner (while in the absence of this option only
very guilt-averse experts would behave that way). Psychological forward-induction arguments are theoretically elegant (they
rely only on the assumption of common belief in rationality without evoking equilibrium thinking) and quite powerful (in
many games evoking equilibrium yields multiplicity while applying psychological forward induction yields uniqueness –
game Γ2 in Battigalli and Dufwenberg, 2009, is an example).
Our results from an experiment with 208 participants conﬁrm the behavioral relevance of promises: most experts make
the predicted promise and proper promises induce consumer-friendly behavior. However, we also obtain some data that
is clearly inconsistent with the current version of the theory of ‘simple guilt’: A non-negligible fraction of experts make
promises that should not be observed according to this theory and this fraction is increasing over time. We discuss this
point further in the discussion and conclusion section. Turning to the effect of the money-burning option our results fail to
conﬁrm its behavioral relevance, thus conﬁrming earlier studies. We conclude that promises are behaviorally relevant but
that their impact cannot be explained by psychological guilt aversion theory alone, and that money burning is less powerful
in practice than in theory.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces three versions of our credence goods game, a baseline
game, an extended game where the expert has an option to make a promise to the consumer before the consumer decides
whether to interact with the expert, and a different extension in which the consumer has an option to burn money before
interacting with the expert. The section ends with predictions for the three games for the case where it is common knowl-
edge that all agents are rational and exclusively interested in their own material payoffs. Section 3 introduces belief-based
guilt aversion and studies its impact on behavior in the three games. Section 4 explains the experimental design and derives
predictions for our three treatments which correspond to the three games introduced in Section 2. Section 5 reports the
experimental results, and Section 6 discusses alternative explanations and concludes. All proofs are in Appendix A.
2. Material games
2.1. Baseline game, ΓB
We take a simpliﬁed version of Dulleck and Kerschbamer’s (2006) model of credence goods as our starting point. In this
game, there are two players, an expert (he) and a consumer (she). The consumer has a problem θ that is with an ex ante
probability ql minor (θ = l) and with probability 1− ql major (θ = h). If the consumer decides to visit the expert, the expert
ﬁnds out the severity of the problem by performing a diagnosis. He then provides a service that is either of high (h) or of
low (l) quality. In the following, we denote the index of the quality provided (the expert’s “provision decision”) by τ ∈ {l,h}.
The high quality solves both types of problems, while the low quality is only suﬃcient for the minor problem. Different
qualities come at different costs for the expert. Denoting the cost to the expert for providing the quality τ ∈ {l,h} by Cτ ,
it holds that Cl < Ch .4 For the quality he has provided the expert can charge one of two exogenously given prices, either
Pl or Ph , with Pl > Cl , Ph > Ch , and Ph  Pl . In what follows, we denote the index of the quality charged for (the expert’s
“charging decision”) by η ∈ {l,h}. The price the expert charges does not need to correspond to the quality he has actually
provided. That is, η can be different from τ . If the quality is suﬃcient, i.e. if τ = h for θ = h, or τ ∈ {l,h} for θ = l, the
consumer receives a value of V > 0, otherwise she receives a value of zero. In the sequel we assume that V satisﬁes
V >max
{
Ch,
Ch − Cl
1− ql
}
. (1)
4 For simplicity we will often denote both the quality provided and the cost of the quality provided by Cτ . No confusion should result.
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where τ is the index for the provided quality and η is the index for the charged price. Non-singleton information sets, that is the dashed lines, represent
the consumer’s terminal information. The expert’s material payoff is the top value of the payoff vector, and the consumer’s payoff is the bottom value of
the payoff vector.
That V is larger than the ﬁrst element in {·} makes sure that solving the major problem with the high-quality service is
more eﬃcient than leaving the major problem unsolved and that V is larger than the second element implies that, from an
ex ante perspective, providing the high-quality service is more eﬃcient than providing the low-quality one.
If an interaction takes place the material payoff of the consumer, denoted πc(τ ,η|θ), is the value (of V or 0) minus the
price for the quality charged for:
πc(τ ,η|θ) =
{−Pη for τ = l, η ∈ {l,h} and θ = h,
V − Pη for any other (τ ,η, θ) ∈ {l,h}3.
The material payoff of the expert in the case of interaction, πe(τ ,η), corresponds to the price charged minus the cost of
the quality provided:
πe(τ ,η) = Pη − Cτ for any (τ ,η, θ) ∈ {l,h}3.
If no trade takes place both parties end up with a material payoff of zero. To make things interesting we assume that
V < Ph/ql. (2)
This condition implies that if both players are exclusively interested in their own material payoffs and if this fact is common
knowledge, then the consumer never accepts to be served, causing a breakdown of the market. See Subsection 2.4 for details.
The order of moves is shown in Fig. 1. Prices are exogenously given and observed by both players. Based on this infor-
mation the consumer decides whether to visit the expert or not. We denote this decision by m ∈ {a, r}, where a stands for
acceptance and r for rejection. If the consumer interacts with the expert, a random move by nature determines the severity
of her problem. The expert observes the severity and then decides which quality to provide and which price to charge. We
deﬁne overcharging as charging for the high quality while providing the low one (τ = l, η = h|θ ∈ {l,h}), undertreatment as
providing the low quality when the consumer has the major problem (τ = l, η ∈ {l,h}|θ = h), and overtreatment as providing
the high quality when the consumer has the minor problem (τ = h, η ∈ {l,h}|θ = l).
Notice that in this game neither is the expert obliged to provide a quality that solves the consumer’s problem, nor can
the expert’s action be (perfectly) veriﬁed.5 We denote this baseline game by ΓB . In the sequel we modify it to two extended
games, ΓP and ΓM .
2.2. Game with promise option, ΓP
In ΓP at the start of the game the expert has the option to make a non-binding promise p from the set P =
{NO, SQ,AP, SQ&AP} to the consumer, where the elements of P are deﬁned as follows6:
5 Only when the consumer has a major problem and the expert provides the low quality, the consumer can indirectly infer her problem type and the
quality provided since then she receives no positive value.
6 A capital P stands for two different things in this paper: When it comes with a subscript (as in Pl and Ph ) it stands for a price, when it comes without
a subscript (as in p ∈ P) it denotes the set of available promises in game ΓP and in experimental treatment T P .
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SQ (“suﬃcient quality”): a promise to provide suﬃcient quality;
AP (“appropriate price”): a promise to charge the price for the quality provided;
SQ&AP (“suﬃcient quality and appropriate price”): a promise to provide suﬃcient quality and to charge the price for the
quality provided.
Promises have neither an effect on the available alternatives in the subgame starting after a promise has been made, nor
an effect on the material payoffs players receive for any (τ ,η, θ) ∈ {l,h}3.7
2.3. Game with money-burning option, ΓM
In ΓM at the start of the game the consumer has the opportunity to choose a money-burning option m out of a ﬁnite
set M = {0, ,2, . . . , x}, where  > 0 is some smallest currency unit and x some strictly positive integer satisfying x 
(V − Ph − )/ .8 That is, instead of deciding whether to visit the expert or not, (m ∈ {a, r}), the consumer is now allowed
to choose a message m ∈ M ∪ {r}, where r stands again for rejecting interaction. In case of participation (m ∈ M), the sum
m is deducted from the consumer’s material payoff (but is not transferred to the expert), and the expert is informed about
the magnitude of the sum before making his provision and charging decision. Accordingly, the consumer’s material payoff
in case of participation changes to πc(τ ,η|θ) −m, while the expert’s material payoff stays the same (as in ΓB ).9
2.4. Standard predictions
Consider game ΓB . Suppose that both parties are rational, risk-neutral and care only for their own material payoffs, and
that this is common knowledge. Then in any Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) the expert always provides the low quality
and charges the price for the high quality if the consumer accepts; anticipating this, the consumer decides against the visit
of the expert (this follows from condition (2)), which leads to a market breakdown. The prediction for ΓP is basically the
same: In this game the expert has a much larger strategy space – he now chooses a promise p from the set P at the start,
and for each p and each θ he then chooses τ ∈ {l,h} and η ∈ {l,h} – but this does not have any effect on the predicted path:
The consumer knows that she will always receive the low quality and pay the high price whatever the promise of the expert
is. So she will decide against participation, in case of participation p is arbitrary, and for any p we get undertreatment and
overcharging just as in ΓB . The argument for ΓM is similar, also leading to a market breakdown.
3. The impact of guilt aversion on market outcomes
The predictions for our three games change signiﬁcantly if the expert has a disposition to feel guilty when he believes
that he violates the consumer’s payoff expectation. To show this we modify the expert’s utility function to incorporate a
guilt sentiment a là Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2007). To translate their ‘simple guilt’ hypothesis to the present context
consider the baseline game and let αa denote the consumer’s initial (ﬁrst-order) belief about the expert’s provision and
charging behavior in case of acceptance, and βa the expert’s expectation of αa , conditional on the consumer’s acceptance.
Then the expert’s ex post utility for the case where the consumer has accepted, the expert has provided the quality Cτ
and charged the price Pη , given the consumer has problem θ and the expert the belief βa , is assumed to be given by
Ue(τ ,η|θ,βa) = Pη − Cτ − γ max{Eβa (πc(τ ′, η′|θ))−πc(τ ,η|θ),0}, where Eβa is the conditional expectation operator given
the belief βa and γ  0 is a psychological guilt-sensitivity parameter. We start by securing some facts that are true for any
expectation the expert might hold and any value of the guilt-sensitivity parameter. To avoid a lot of conditional statements
we strengthen for the rest of the paper our condition (1) by imposing in addition the requirement
V >max
{
Ph − Pl
ql
,
Ch − Cl
ql
}
, (3)
which is fulﬁlled by the parameter constellations implemented in the experiment. Given this condition we get (all formal
statements and proofs are in Appendix A):
Observation 1. If the consumer has the minor problem, then the expert strictly prefers providing the low over providing the high quality
service.
7 The game ΓP resembles the stochastic trust game studied by Charness and Dufwenberg (2006). Our novelty here is to transfer their ideas and frame-
work to the richer credence goods context where different types of promises are related to speciﬁc problems in such markets, and where the stochastic
structure of the game allows for some discrimination between different explanations for promise-keeping (as discussed in the concluding section).
8 This restriction simpliﬁes the presentation without qualitatively affecting the results – see Appendix A for details.
9 The game ΓM is a close relative of the “Generalized Trust Game with Guilt Aversion” discussed in Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2009, p. 23).
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reduces the expert’s material payoff but has no effect on the amount of guilt as it leaves the consumer’s material payoff
and her payoff expectation unaffected.
Observation 2. Generically, an expert who is willing to solve the consumer’s problem in both states will charge the same price in both
states.
Observation 2 implies that a guilt-averse expert will never provide the appropriate quality and charge the price for the
quality provided in both states.10 This follows (i) from the observation that the consumer’s payoff expectation is necessarily
an average over the payoffs in the two states and as such depends neither on the severity of her problem nor on the expert’s
provision behavior; and (ii) from the fact that – for the case where the consumer’s problem is solved – her actual payoff
does not depend on those variables either. Thus, for the case where the consumer’s problem is solved, charging the low
instead of the high price involves exactly the same trade-off for the expert in both states: The cost is material and amounts
to Ph − Pl in both states, and the beneﬁt consists in reducing the amount of guilt which is also the same in both states.
Observation 3. The expert will never undertreat the consumer and at the same time charge honestly. Moreover, if the expert prefers
charging the low over charging the high price when he solves the major problem, then he also prefers solving the consumer’s major
problem over letting it unsolved.
Observation 3 is important because it implies that undertreatment is easier to prevent than overcharging. The reason is
that overcharging involves a pure (1:1) transfer of money from the customer to the expert while undertreatment involves a
transfer that is associated with an eﬃciency loss. Thus, for an expert not to have an incentive to overcharge, the material
payoff of the customer must receive at least the same weight in the expert’s utility function as the expert’s own material
payoff. A necessary condition for this to be the case is a value of the guilt-sensitivity parameter γ of at least 1. Together
with the belief that the consumer has a high payoff expectation this condition is also suﬃcient. By contrast, if the expert
undertreats the customer then his material payoff increases by Ch − Cl , while the material payoff of the customer decreases
by V > Ch − Cl . Thus, for a given (high) payoff expectation of the customer a lower value of γ is suﬃcient to prevent
undertreatment.11
Observations 1–3 together imply that generically the expert’s behavior in the subgame starting after the consumer has
accepted is of one of the following three types:
• type-1 behavior: the expert provides the low quality and charges the price for the high quality in both states;
• type-2 behavior: the expert provides the low quality if the consumer has the minor problem and the high quality if
she has the major problem and he charges the price for the high quality in both states;
• type-3 behavior: the expert provides the low quality if the consumer has the minor problem and the high quality if
she has the major problem and he charges the price for the low quality in both states.
3.1. Guilt aversion in the baseline game, ΓB
We explore the impact of guilt aversion in ΓB under two conditions. In the ﬁrst condition, we assume that players
coordinate on a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (hereafter PBE). The notion of PBE implies that players never change their
beliefs about the beliefs of their opponents along the predicted path. As Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2009) argue in their
pioneering paper on dynamic psychological games, however, this implication might be considered as questionable in a psy-
chological game. Hence, in our second condition we relax the consistency condition of PBE to allow the expert to change his
second-order belief when he observes an unexpected move by the consumer. Speciﬁcally, we allow the expert to draw infer-
ences about the consumer’s unobservable ﬁrst-order belief from her observable participation decision via forward-induction
reasoning.
Equilibrium analysis in Γ B . Given the ﬁndings above and the requirement that in equilibrium beliefs of all orders have to be
consistent with actual behavior, it is straightforward to prove that generically the baseline game admits three types of PBE:
(i) type-1 equilibria in which the consumer rejects and the expert exhibits type-1 behavior in case of acceptance; (ii) type-2
equilibria in which the consumer accepts and the expert exhibits type-2 behavior in case of acceptance; and (iii) type-3
equilibria in which the consumer accepts and the expert exhibits type-3 behavior in case of acceptance. The bounds for
existence of each of the three types of PBE are as shown in Fig. 2. As can be seen from this ﬁgure, for relatively low values
10 An exception is the case where the expert is exactly indifferent between charging the low and charging the high price and when he is indifferent then
he is so in both states. However, for any belief the expert might hold, this case is non-generic as it is consistent with at most a single realization of the
guilt-sensitivity parameter.
11 Note that invoking “guilt from blame” (as deﬁned in Battigalli and Dufwenberg, 2007) would qualitatively yield the same prediction: A player suffering
“guilt from blame” cares about others’ inferences regarding the extent to which he is willing to let them down. Since undertreatment is observable while
overcharging is not (except for the case where it comes together with undertreatment; see the information sets on terminal nodes in Fig. 1) an expert
suffering guilt from blame has more incentives to avoid undertreatment than overcharging.
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of the guilt-sensitivity parameter γ there is a unique PBE and the behavior in that PBE implies market breakdown, just as
in the selﬁsh benchmark of Subsection 2.4. In an intermediate range both market breakdown (supported by the expectation
that the expert exhibits type-1 behavior in case of acceptance) and acceptance (supported by the belief that the expert
exhibits type-2 behavior in case of acceptance) are consistent with equilibrium. And for relatively high values of γ the
market necessarily works well: the consumer accepts and she gets the appropriate treatment in any PBE.
Forward-induction reasoning in Γ B . Following Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2009) consider the following psychological
forward-induction argument: Suppose the consumer accepts. If she is rational, she must believe that the expert behaves
in a way that implies a material payoff of at least 0 for her – since this is what she receives if she rejects. Thus, even
if the expert is initially uncertain regarding the customer’s expectation, if he believes that the consumer is rational, then
he infers Eαa (πc) 0 from her acceptance. Thus, Eβa (πc) 0, which in turn implies that for values of the guilt-sensitivity
parameter γ above the threshold (Ch − Cl)/Ph type-1 behavior is dominated by type-2 behavior. It follows that for any
γ > (Ch − Cl)/Ph only type-2 and type-3 equilibria are consistent with forward-induction reasoning in ΓB .
3.2. Guilt aversion in the game with promise option, ΓP
Again, we explore the impact of guilt aversion under two conditions, ﬁrst under the (equilibrium) assumption that
promises are believed (and believed to be believed) if and only if believing in the promise is consistent with equilibrium;
and then under the (non-equilibrium) assumption that promises are believed (and believed to be believed) whatever their
content is.
Equilibrium analysis in Γ P . Under the assumptions that promises are believed (and believed to be believed) if and only if
believing in the promise is consistent with equilibrium, promises NO and SQ&AP never have any effect, the former because it
has no content and the latter because generically there is no PBE in which the expert provides suﬃcient quality and charges
the price for the quality provided in both states. By contrast, the impact of promises SQ and AP on the expert’s behavior
in the subgame starting after the consumer has accepted depends on the realization of γ . For values of γ in the range
[(Ch −Cl)/V , (Ch −Cl)/qlV ], promise SQ selects the type-2 equilibrium, while AP selects the type-1 equilibrium. Since type-1
equilibrium involves rejection while type-2 equilibrium entails proﬁtable trade, the model predicts that the expert makes
promise SQ and that he exhibits type-2 behavior after acceptance. Our model makes no prediction for other values of γ .
Non-equilibrium analysis in Γ P . Suppose now that promises are believed (and believed to be believed) whatever their
content is. Speciﬁcally, assume that for any promise p ∈ P the consumer expects that, in case of acceptance, the expert
maximizes lexicographically, ﬁrst his own material payoff subject to the constraint that his promise is kept, and secondly
(in case of a tie in own material payoffs) the payoff of the consumer (over the options that yield him the same material
payoff). Further assume that the expert expects that the consumer has such beliefs. For this expectation it is straightforward
to show that the expert’s behavior for the case where the consumer has accepted after promise p ∈ P is as shown in Fig. 3.
First notice that the promise NO yields rejection. Thus, the expert will never use this promise if he expects that promises
are believed. Next notice that SQ strictly dominates SQ&AP for any γ > 0. To see this, ﬁrst note that both promises yield
acceptance by the consumer. Furthermore, for γ > 1/ql the promise SQ&AP implies a lower price for the consumer than SQ
at a material cost for the expert, but exactly the same amount of guilt; and for γ  1/ql both promises yield exactly the
same behavior (and thereby also the same material payoff for the expert), but SQ&AP yields a higher payoff expectation and
therewith a higher amount of guilt than SQ . Thus, promise SQ&AP will never be made if it is expected to be believed. So we
are left with the promises in the set {SQ,AP} and conclude that the expert will make one of these promises and that the
promise made by the expert is accepted by the consumer. Thus, promises are predicted to increase the frequency of trade
under this condition.
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APUT stands for the promise AP under an undertreatment price-vector (i.e. Ph − Ch < Pl − Cl). The behavior after the promise AP under an overtreatment
price-vector (deﬁned by Ph − Ch > Pl − Cl) is the same as after promise SQ , and the behavior under an equal mark-up vector (deﬁned by Ph − Ch = Pl − Cl)
is the same as after SQ&AP.
3.3. Guilt aversion in the game with money-burning option, ΓM
Equilibrium analysis in Γ M . It is easily veriﬁed that the type of behavior consistent with equilibrium in the subgame
starting after the consumer has sent message m ∈ M does not depend on the amount of money burned by the consumer.
Whether actual money burning is consistent with equilibrium depends on the extent to which the expert is guilt averse.
For γ < (Ch − Cl)/V there is no equilibrium in which the consumer decides for an m ∈ {, . . . , x} (she knows that, in case
of acceptance, the expert always provides the low quality and charges the price for the high quality for any m ∈ M , and
therefore decides for m = r); for γ ∈ ((Ch − Cl)/qlV ,1) there is no PBE in which she decides for such an m either (she
knows that, in case of acceptance, the expert always provides the appropriate quality and charges the price for the high
quality for any m ∈ M , and therefore decides for m = 0). For the remaining ranges of γ there is equilibrium multiplicity and
actual money burning is consistent with PBE.
Forward-induction reasoning in Γ M . We now show that iterated forward-induction reasoning has quite some power in
our money-burning game. Speciﬁcally, we show that the path predicted by (iterated) forward induction is unique for any
γ ∈ ((Ch − Cl)/(Ph + x),1) and that the predicted path involves full eﬃciency (interaction followed by appropriate service)
without money burning. We start by showing that – for guilt-sensitivity parameters in this range – for any m = r only type-2
behavior is consistent with the assumption of common knowledge of rationality. To see this, ﬁrst suppose the consumer
burns the maximal feasible amount, x . If the expert is rational and believes in the rationality of the consumer, then he
infers from this move that the consumer expects at least x . Therefore, Eβx (πc)  x . In Appendix A we show that an
expert with such an expectation necessarily provides the high quality service to a consumer who has the major problem for
any γ > (Ch − Cl)/(Ph + x). Thus, for guilt-sensitivity parameters in this range, burning x gives the consumer a payoff of
V − Ph − x for sure. Taking the same logic one step further, suppose now the consumer burns the amount (x− 1) . Then
the expert infers from that that the consumer expects at least V − Ph − x . This is so because – if both the expert and the
consumer accept the above reasoning – they believe that by burning the amount x the consumer can guarantee a material
payoff of at least V − Ph − x . Hence, burning less money is consistent with common knowledge of rationality only if it does
not yield less. Now, we can apply the same logic to show that the expert treats the consumer appropriately, even when she
burns only the amount (x− 1) . Proceeding this way further we get to the prediction that for any m 0 (even for m = 0!)
the expert treats the consumer appropriately. Anticipating appropriate treatment for any m  0, the consumer decides not
to burn any money (that is, to choose m = 0). Thus, actually burning money is not necessary to shape second-order beliefs
and behavior; knowing that a money-burning option was available to the consumer is suﬃcient to induce consumer-friendly
behavior.
4. Experimental design
At the beginning of our experiment, subjects were informed about their (ﬁxed) role as either an expert or a consumer,
and they received an initial endowment of 200 experimental currency units (ECU), equivalent to 2.5 Euro. Each session was
run with 16 subjects who were split into two matching groups of 8 subjects each, yielding two independent observations
per session. In each matching group, four subjects had the role of an expert, and the other four that of a consumer. Experts
only interacted with consumers in the same matching group. The consumer’s probability of having the minor problem
was ql = 0.5 and the value for receiving a suﬃcient quality was V = 100 ECU. The cost of providing the low quality was
Cl = 0 ECU, and the cost of providing the high quality was Ch = 30 ECU. Each expert was exposed to each price-vector
(Pl, Ph) in the set {(30,50), (30,60), (30,70), (30,65), (40,65), (50,65)} four times, two times with the consumer having
a minor problem and two times with the consumer having a major problem.12 In total this sums up to 24 rounds for
each subject, and the proﬁts from all rounds were added up to yield the total payoffs. The sequence of (price-vector,
problem)-pairs was randomized on the individual expert’s level.
12 In the theory section we have distinguished between “undertreatment”, “overtreatment” and “equal mark-up” price-vectors (see the text to Fig. 3). In
the set of tested price-vectors (30,50), (40,65), and (50,65) are undertreatment vectors, (30,60) is an equal mark-up vector, and (30,65) and (30,70) are
overtreatment vectors.
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described in Section 2. More details on treatments follow below. The experiment was run in June 2009. All sessions were
computerized using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) and recruiting was done with ORSEE (Greiner, 2004). Four sessions were
conducted for treatments TB , and T P , and ﬁve for treatment TM . In total we had 208 undergraduate students from the
University of Innsbruck participating in the experiment. At the beginning of each session, the instructions (see Appendix B)
were read aloud to make them common knowledge. Subjects were also given about 10 minutes to read through the in-
structions alone and ask questions. Before the experiment started, subjects had to answer a set of control questions, and
the experiment proceeded only after all control questions were answered correctly. Each session, including instructions and
control questions, lasted on average 1 hour and 15 minutes, and subjects’ average earnings, including a show up fee of
5 Euro, were 15 Euro.
4.1. Description and prediction for baseline treatment, T B
In treatment TB , which corresponds to game ΓB , at the beginning of each round, an expert was randomly paired with
a consumer, and both got to know the price-vector (Pl, Ph). Then the consumer could decide whether she would like to
interact with the expert or not. If the consumer decided to interact with the expert, the expert got to know the problem of
the consumer and decided which quality to provide and which price to charge. At the end of each round both the consumer
and the expert were informed of their own payoffs. Based on the theoretical analysis in Section 3 our prediction for TB is13:
Prediction 1 (Behavior in baseline treatment). P1a: Conditional on acceptance (m = r), the expert exhibits either (1) type-1
behavior: he provides the low quality and charges the price for the high quality in both states; or (2) type-2 behavior: he
provides the low quality if the consumer has the minor problem and the high quality if she has the major problem, and he
charges the price for the high quality in both states; or (3) type-3 behavior: he provides the low quality if the consumer has
the minor problem and the high quality if she has the major problem and he charges the price for the low quality in both
states. Overtreatment (provision of the high quality if the consumer has the minor problem) is rarely observed for any price
constellation. P1b: If psychological forward induction works, type-2 behavior becomes more and type-1 behavior becomes
less frequent when Ph increases; by contrast, the frequency of type-3 behavior does not depend on Ph .
4.2. Description and prediction for treatment with promise option, T P
In the treatment T P , which corresponds to game ΓP , the expert was given an opportunity to send one of the following
four messages after having observed the price-vector14:
NO: “Hello”.
SQ: “I promise I will provide a suﬃcient quality”.
AP: “I promise I will charge the low price if I provide the low quality, and I will charge the high price if I provide the high
quality”.
SQ&AP: “I promise I will provide the low quality and charge for it if you have the minor problem, and I will provide the
high quality and charge for it if you have the major problem”.
Based on the theoretical analysis in the previous section our prediction for T P is:
Prediction 2 (The effect of giving the expert an option to make a promise). P2a: Promise SQ is frequently observed in T P , while
promises NO and SQ&AP are rarely observed. P2b: Compared to the baseline treatment TB consumers are more likely to
accept in T P after promises SQ and SQ&AP and less likely to accept after promise NO. P2c: Conditional on acceptance
(m = r), the expert is more likely to behave in a consumer-friendly manner in T P than in TB . Furthermore, in T P the expert
is more likely to behave in a consumer-friendly manner after promises SQ and SQ&AP than after promises NO and APUT .15
4.3. Description and prediction for treatment with money-burning option, TM
In the treatment TM , which corresponds to game ΓM , the consumer could decide whether she would like to interact
with the expert or not. If not, the game ended and both got zero payment for this particular round. If yes, the consumer
13 While introducing psychological guilt aversion into our simple credence goods model would allow for sharp point predictions, we formulate weaker
statements to illustrate the qualitative effects that we expect from guilt aversion. For instance, we translate the point prediction (from Observation 1) that
an expert never overtreats a customer into the weaker statement that overtreatment is rarely observed.
14 The exact wording of the experimental instructions (see Appendix B) refers to the consumer’s two problems as “Problem I” (minor problem) and
“Problem II” (major problem), and to the two qualities of the good as “Solution I” (low quality) and “Solution II” (high quality). In the text we rephrase the
wording so that it matches the terminology used in the theory part of the paper.
15 Remember that APUT stands for the promise AP under an undertreatment price-vector (i.e., a price-vector satisfying Ph − Ch < Pl − Cl). Such a price-
vector makes providing the low quality more proﬁtable than providing the high quality if the appropriate price is charged for.
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Relative frequencies of behavior in TB , conditional on price-vector.
Price-vectors
(Pl, Ph)
θ = l θ = h
(l, l) (l,h) (h, l) (h,h) (l, l) (l,h) (h, l) (h,h)
all 0.05 0.94 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.73 0.00 0.24
(30,50) 0.05 0.93 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.80 0.00 0.18
(30,60) 0.04 0.94 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.65 0.00 0.32
(30,65) 0.02 0.97 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.75 0.00 0.23
(30,70) 0.02 0.98 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.82 0.00 0.18
(40,65) 0.04 0.94 0.02 0.00 0.08 0.71 0.00 0.21
(50,65) 0.14 0.86 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.64 0.03 0.33
could voluntarily pay an “interaction price” m from the discrete set M = {0,5,10, . . . ,30} to the experimenter. That is, in
the notation introduced in the theory section, we had  = 5 and x = 6 in our treatment TM .16 Based on our theoretical
analysis our prediction for TM would be that the consumer either rejects, or accepts without burning money. This extreme
prediction is based on iterated forward-induction reasoning which requires – for each additional iteration – that players’
knowledge of each others’ rationality is one level deeper. Results from previous experiments – e.g., on Nagel’s guessing
game (see Nagel, 1995, or Ho et al., 1998) – suggest that assuming so much sophistication probably means assuming too
much. How does the prediction for TM change if we apply forward-induction reasoning (requiring only two layers of mutual
knowledge of rationality) without iteration? Then, if the consumer burns the amount y, the expert infers from this that the
consumer expects at least y. That is, in this case we get an increasing relationship between the amount of money the
consumer burns and the lower bound on the second-order belief of the expert. Based on this reasoning (and the arguments
in the theory section) our prediction for TM is:
Prediction 3 (The effect of giving the consumer an option to burnmoney). P3a: Compared to the baseline treatment T B consumers
are more willing to accept (that is, to choose an m ∈ {0,5,10, . . . ,30}) in TM . P3b: Message m = 0 is frequently observed
in TM , while messages in {5,10, . . . ,30} are rarely observed. P3c: Conditional on acceptance (m = r), the expert is more
likely to behave in a consumer-friendly manner in TM than in TB . Furthermore, in TM the expert is more likely to behave
in a consumer-friendly manner when Ph is higher and when the consumer burns a higher amount of money.
5. Experimental results
In reporting the experimental results we proceed in the same order as in previous sections. That is, we start with the
baseline treatment, then discuss the effect of introducing an opportunity to make a promise, and ﬁnally report the effects
of allowing for a money-burning option.17 Given that our games are rather complex when being exposed to them for the
ﬁrst time (in particular in treatments with promise options or money-burning options) we concentrate in the subsequent
analysis on the ﬁnal 20 rounds (i.e., rounds 5–24), thus considering rounds 1–4 as an opportunity for subjects to gather
experience with the game. When we have an ex ante directional hypothesis we use a one-sided test, otherwise a two-sided
test.
5.1. Results for the baseline treatment, T B
Testing predictions P1a and P1b directly is diﬃcult, because they refer to complete strategies, while we can only observe
an expert’s provision and charging decision in one of the two states. We therefore proceed as follows. First, we check
whether the aggregate data is qualitatively consistent with the theoretical predictions that (i) a consumer with the minor
problem will always receive the low quality service (no overtreatment), and that (ii) undertreatment always comes together
with overcharging. Next we exploit the fact that the major problem allows for a neat identiﬁcation of the behavioral type,
while the minor problem does not. Speciﬁcally, in analyzing the data we use the fact that for the case where the consumer
has the major problem, type-1 behavior yields undertreatment and overcharging, type-2 behavior implies appropriate quality
and charging for the quality provided, and type-3 behavior yields appropriate quality and charging the price for the low
quality. Consistent with the theoretical prediction overtreatment is rarely observed – overall, it occurred in less than 2%
of the possible cases. Also, undertreatment almost always came together with overcharging – undertreatment with honest
charging occurred in only about 3% of possible cases. Identifying the relative frequencies of type-1, type-2, and type-3
behavior by looking at experts’ choices when they faced a major problem, we see (in Table 1) that 73% of the choices are
consistent with type-1 behavior, 24% of the choices are consistent with type-2 behavior, and less than 1% of the choices are
consistent with type-3 behavior. Thus, type-3 behavior is practically absent while the rest of P1a is largely conﬁrmed.
16 Note that an “interaction price” of 0 results in trade; thus, m = 0 is different from opting out (m = r).
17 In the working paper version of this paper we also present a treatment that combines promises (by the expert) and money burning (by the consumer).
For reasons of succinctness, we do not report this treatment here but refer the interested reader to Beck et al. (2010).
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Relative frequencies of promises in T P , conditional on price-vector.
Price-vectors
(Pl, Ph)
Promises
NO SQ AP SQ&AP
all 0.07 0.53 0.14 0.26
(30,50) 0.09 0.52 0.15 0.23
(30,60) 0.07 0.55 0.12 0.26
(30,65) 0.05 0.52 0.16 0.28
(30,70) 0.06 0.55 0.13 0.26
(40,65) 0.08 0.52 0.12 0.28
(50,65) 0.04 0.52 0.19 0.26
Fig. 4. Development of promises NO, SQ , AP, and SQ&AP over time in treatment T P (smoothed by calculating 3-period moving averages).
In our experiment, Ph can take the value of 50, 60, 65, and 70. Prediction P1b says that if psychological forward induction
works then type-2 behavior should become more and type-1 behavior less frequent when Ph increases. To see the effects of
Ph on provision behavior, we computed the relative frequencies of type-1, type-2, and type-3 behavior for the four values
of Ph , again using choices when experts faced a major problem for identiﬁcation. As we can see from Table 1, there is no
evidence supporting P1b (one-sided Wilcoxon tests are insigniﬁcant).18
5.2. Results for treatment with promise options, T P
Table 2 reports the relative frequencies of promises in treatment T P . Consistent with P2a, we see that promise SQ is
(with 53% of possible observations) frequently made, while NO is (with 7%) rarely made. The distribution of promises is
also signiﬁcantly different from a random one (χ2 test: p < 0.01). As we can see from Table 2, the kind of promise made
does not depend on the price-vector. A surprising observation is that a signiﬁcant proportion of promises (26%) were SQ&AP
which is a dominated promise for an expert suffering from ‘simple guilt’. Even more surprising, this message becomes more
popular in later rounds, as can be seen in Fig. 4. This ﬁgure displays the development of the four promises over time and
shows that while the relative frequency of SQ and AP remains rather constant, it is increasing for SQ&AP and decreasing
for NO. One possible explanation for this observation is that experts – instead of suffering from ‘simple guilt’ – suffer
18 We also searched for evidence in support of P1b at the individual level. For instance, deﬁning an expert to be guilt averse if he provides the high
quality in at least x% of cases where he faces a consumer with the major problem, we asked – for different values of x – whether guilt-averse experts
behaved in a more consumer-friendly manner when Ph is higher. We found no evidence in support of P1b either.
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Probit regression of interaction with random effects on consumer subjects. The reference is treatment TB . TM denotes the treatment
with money-burning option, NO, SQ , AP, and SQ&AP are the four types of promises in treatment T P .
Value Std. error t-value p-value
Intercept 1.175 0.086 13.727 < 0.01
Period −0.019 0.004 −4.624 < 0.01
TM 0.171 0.058 2.923 < 0.01
NO −1.147 0.162 −7.067 < 0.01
SQ 0.483 0.083 5.843 < 0.01
AP 0.088 0.124 0.714 0.475
SQ&AP 0.214 0.097 2.217 0.027
Std. Error of the random effects on individual expert subjects: 0.3453.
from ‘guilt from blame’.19 Also, if consumers believe in a promise whatever its content is, then they are more willing to
accept after SQ&AP than after SQ, giving (selﬁsh) experts an incentive to make the promise SQ&AP. This yields a second
explanation for the prevalence of SQ&AP. We will discuss alternative explanations in Section 6.
To test prediction P2b we compare interaction rates. The interaction rate is deﬁned as the relative frequency with which
consumers accept to trade with an expert. In treatment T P it is with 0.85 weakly signiﬁcantly larger than in TB with 0.81
(one-sided Wilcoxon test based on 8 independent observations, p = 0.09), see Table 4. One reason for the weak effect of
promises in T P against TB is perhaps that the interaction rate is already rather high in the baseline treatment. The scope
of a further increase in the interaction rate is therefore limited. Another possibility is that messages, despite our efforts
of making them rich and endogenous, might still be perceived as ‘bare’. Charness and Dufwenberg (2010) argue that bare
promises are virtually ineffective. When calculating the interaction rates after promise NO, SQ , AP, and SQ&AP separately,
we see that it is 0.47 after promise NO, 0.90 after promise SQ , 0.82 after promise AP, and 0.85 after promise SQ&AP. Thus,
by making the right sort of promise (SQ) the probability of an interaction not taking place is halved (relative to the baseline
treatment), while by making the wrong promise (NO) this probability is more than doubled. Comparing the interaction
rates with promises to the corresponding value in the baseline treatment with one-sided Wilcoxon tests we ﬁnd that the
difference is signiﬁcant for promise NO (0.47 after NO vs 0.81 in the baseline, p = 0.001), but not signiﬁcant for the other
promises (p > 0.10).20 Since some matching groups only had very few observations for speciﬁc promises, we also ran a
Probit regression with random effects in order to see more clearly the effects of promises and to compare them directly to
the baseline treatment. The dependent variable is the binary interaction value, 0 or 1. The independent variables include
a dummy variable for the treatment with money-burning options, TB (to be discussed below), and four dummy variables
for the promises NO, SQ , AP, and SQ&AP. Random effects are on the level of the individual consumer. The results of the
regression are reported in Table 3. As we can see from this table, compared to the baseline treatment TB consumers are
signiﬁcantly more likely to accept after promises SQ and SQ&AP and less likely to accept after promise NO. The interaction
rate after promise AP is not signiﬁcantly different from that of the baseline treatment TB . Thus, consumers’ acceptance
behavior is largely consistent with P2b. Table 3 also shows that the consumer’s acceptance is signiﬁcantly decreasing over
time (by about 2 percentage points per period), indicating that consumers shy away more often from interaction the more
experience they have gained in the market.
To test prediction P2c we shall use two proxies to capture how consumer-friendly an expert is: the undertreatment rate
and the honesty rate. The undertreatment rate is deﬁned as the ratio of cases where the consumer actually got undertreated
(having the major problem and receiving the low quality) over all cases where the consumer agreed to interact and had
the major problem. The honesty rate is deﬁned as the ratio of honest behavior (getting the needed quality and paying
accordingly) over all cases with interaction.21
Table 4 compares treatments TB and T P . The aggregate picture emerging from the ﬁrst two columns suggests that the
possibility to make promises decreases the undertreatment rate and increases the honesty rate. However, none of these dif-
ferences between T P and TB is statistically signiﬁcant (one-sided Wilcoxon rank-sum tests: p > 0.10). Compared to experts’
behavior after promise NO, experts were signiﬁcantly more friendly after promise SQ: the undertreatment rate decreases
from 1.00 to 0.49 and the honesty rate increases from 0.00 to 0.24 (p < 0.01 for both). Experts’ behavior after promise
SQ&AP is weakly signiﬁcantly more friendly than after promise NO: the undertreatment rate decreases from 1.00 to 0.71
and the honesty rate rises from 0.00 to 0.16 (p < 0.10 for both). Column APUT of Table 4 displays the undertreatment rate
and the honesty rate after promise AP when experts faced undertreatment price-vectors ((30,50), (40,65), (50,65)). In
line with prediction P2c experts behave signiﬁcantly more friendly after promise SQ than after promise APUT : the under-
treatment rate decreases from 0.76 to 0.49 (p < 0.01) and the honesty rate rises from 0.14 to 0.24 (p = 0.016). However,
19 An expert suffering guilt from blame cares about how strongly the consumer thinks that the expert intended to harm her. Since overcharging remains
unobservable, the consumer might hold the belief that the expert always charges appropriately. Under this belief, she would assign blame for the high
price to nature having chosen the major problem and the expert would therefore never feel guilty from being blamed for overcharging.
20 The effects of promises on experts’ payoffs are largely the same as the effects of promises on interaction rates.
21 The overcharging rate, deﬁned as the ratio of cases where consumers actually got overcharged (paying the high price while receiving the low quality)
over all cases where consumers agreed to interact with the expert and received the low quality could also be used as a proxy for consumer-friendliness.
We dropped it from the analysis because it is very close to 1.00 in all treatments, leaving the treatment effects untestable.
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The effects of promises, comparing TB and T P . The numbers of observations with which the relative frequencies are calculated are reported in brackets.
Treatment TB T P
Overall NO SQ AP SQ&AP APUT
Interaction rate 0.81 0.85 0.47∗∗∗ 0.90 0.82 0.85 0.76
(516/640) (546/640) (17/36) (303/335) (74/90) (152/179) (35/46)
Undertreatment rate 0.77 0.60 1.00∗∗∗ 0.49 0.64 0.71 0.76
(202/264) (164/275) (8/8) (70/140) (25/39) (61/86) (13/17)
Honesty rate 0.14 0.21 0.00∗∗∗ 0.24 0.20 0.16 0.14
(72/516) (114/546) (0/17) (74/303) (15/74) (25/152) (5/35)
∗∗∗ / ∗∗ / ∗ signiﬁcantly different from treatment TB at the 1% / 5% / 10% level.   /  /  signiﬁcantly different from promise NO at the 1% / 5% / 10% level.
   /  /  signiﬁcantly different from promise APUT at the 1% / 5% / 10% level.
experts do not behave signiﬁcantly differently after promise APUT than after promise SQ&AP (p > 0.10 for the comparison
of the undertreatment rate and the honesty rate).
5.3. Results for treatment with money-burning option, TM
We now turn to the effects of giving the consumer a money-burning option. The evidence for P3a is, at best, weak. Com-
pared to the baseline treatment TB , the interaction rate is slightly higher in treatment TM . The difference is not signiﬁcant
when using one-sided Wilcoxon test with 8 independent observations (0.81 in T B vs 0.84 in TM , p > 0.10), but is signif-
icant in a Probit regression when controlling for heterogeneity of consumers (see Table 3). Consistent with P3b, we ﬁnd
that among the cases where consumers accept, message m = 0 is observed much more frequently (with 76% of cases) than
messages in {5,10, . . . ,30} (with 24%). Recall that, for guilt-sensitivity parameter γ ∈ [ Ch−ClPh+x ,
Ch−Cl
Ph
), both type-1 and type-2
behavior is consistent with psychological forward-induction reasoning in the baseline game, while only type-2 behavior is
consistent with it in TM for any m ∈ {0,5, . . . ,30}. Thus, if the mass of experts with γ ∈ [ Ch−ClPh+x ,
Ch−Cl
Ph
) is non-negligible
and if multiplicity in predicted paths results in some players coordinating on one and others on the other path, we would
expect signiﬁcantly more consumer-friendly behavior in TM than in TB . Comparing TM with TB we ﬁnd, however, that
experts did not behave in a more consumer-friendly way: the undertreatment rate even rises from 0.77 to 0.83 while the
honesty rate decreases from 0.14 to 0.10, though both comparisons are not signiﬁcant (p > 0.10). Finally, P3c suggests that
in TM experts are more likely to behave in a consumer-friendly manner when Ph is higher and when the consumer burns
more money. To test the ﬁrst part of this hypothesis, we compared the undertreatment rate and the honesty rate when Ph
is low (Ph = 50,60) to the corresponding values when Ph is high (Ph = 65,70). In line with the prediction a higher Ph leads
to more consumer-friendly behavior: When Ph is low, the average undertreatment rate is 0.89 and the average honesty rate
is 0.05, while when Ph is high the corresponding values are 0.78 and 0.12. One-sided Wilcoxon rank-sum tests show that
the differences are signiﬁcant (p = 0.06 for undertreatment rate and p = 0.04 for honesty rate), lending some support to
prediction P3c (see Table 5). To test the second part of the hypothesis (derived under the assumption that forward induction
works, but iterated forward induction does not) we compared the undertreatment rate and the honesty rate for m = 0 to the
corresponding values for m  5. Qualitatively in line with the prediction, burning money leads to more consumer-friendly
behavior: For m 5 the average undertreatment rate is 0.78 and the average honesty rate is 0.12, while the corresponding
values for m = 0 are 0.83 and 0.02. None of these differences is statistically signiﬁcant, however.22 The forward-induction
argument is tricky, and arguably takes some time to ﬁgure out. We therefore also searched for interesting time trends, but
failed to ﬁnd any. Thus, our overall conclusion regarding the money-burning option is that giving the consumer such an
option has at best a minor effect.
6. Discussion and conclusion
Credence goods markets are characterized by informational asymmetries between consumers and experts, which can lead
to various forms of fraud, such as undertreatment, overtreatment, or overcharging. Dulleck et al. (2011) have investigated
the role of institutions and market conditions on experts’ behavior and have shown that liability is important for eﬃciency
on credence goods markets, while ex post veriﬁability of the expert’s actions is not. The impact of soft factors, such as
giving the expert an option to make a promise to consumers, has been ignored so far as potentially important for improving
eﬃciency on credence goods markets.
Soft factors such as non-binding promises have no effect on market behavior if all players are rational and only interested
in their own material payoff, and if this fact is common knowledge. However, if agents have belief-dependent preferences,
soft factors might become behaviorally relevant. This paper has focused on a speciﬁc kind of belief-dependent motivation,
22 We also tested whether it pays for a customer to burn money; on average, it does not.
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The effects of money-burning option in TM , compared to TB . The numbers of observations with which the relative frequencies are calculated are reported
in brackets.
Treatment TB TM
Ph all all 50 or 60 65 or 70 all all
Money burning n.a. all all all 0  5
Interaction rate 0.81 0.84 0.91 0.81 – –
(516/640) (672/800) (238/262) (434/538) – –
Undertreatment rate 0.77 0.82 0.89 0.78∗ 0.83 0.78
(202/264) (274/335) (101/114) (173/221) (213/257) (61/78)
Honesty rate 0.14 0.10 0.05 0.12∗∗ 0.09 0.12
(72/516) (67/672) (13/238) (54/434) (48/510) (19/162)
∗∗∗ / ∗∗ / ∗ signiﬁcantly different between Ph = 50,60 and Ph = 65,70 at the 1% / 5% / 10% level.
n.a. not available in TB .
aversion against ‘simple guilt’ – as formally modeled by Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2007). Speciﬁcally, it has tested the
effects of two devices that are predicted to have no impact on behavior if agents have standard preferences, but have the
power to manipulate beliefs and are therefore predicted to have an impact if players are guilt averse: (i) an opportunity for
the expert to make a non-binding promise; and (ii) an opportunity for the consumer to burn money. In belief-based guilt
aversion theory the ﬁrst opportunity shapes an expert’s behavior if an appropriate promise is made and if it is expected to
be believed by the consumer; by contrast, the second opportunity might change behavior even though this option is never
used along the predicted path.
The results from an experiment with 208 participants conﬁrm the behavioral relevance of promises. Most experts make
the predicted promise and proper promises induce more consumer-friendly behavior. Also, by making the right sort of
promise (SQ) the probability of an interaction not taking place is halved (relative to the baseline treatment), while by mak-
ing the wrong promise (NO) this probability is more than doubled. While our data are largely in line with the predictions
derived from guilt aversion theory, it is important to mention that ‘simple guilt’ cannot explain every detail of our data.
Notably, making the promise SQ&AP is inconsistent with the hypothesis that experts suffer from simple guilt, yet this mes-
sage is fairly popular and becomes even more frequent over time, and is associated with high acceptance rates. A possible
explanation is that experts – instead of suffering from ‘simple guilt’ – have an aversion against ‘guilt from blame’ (as de-
ﬁned in Battigalli and Dufwenberg, 2007), and that consumers anticipate that. An alternative explanation is that experts
dislike disappointing consumer’s behavior expectations. While the hypothesis that players are inclined not to hurt others
relative to their payoff expectations and the alternative story that players are inclined not to hurt others relative to their
behavior expectations are indistinguishable in the simple environments usually studied in lab experiments, they yield differ-
ent predictions in our richer credence good game. The empirical relevance of guilt based on behavior expectations (which
allows for state-dependent payoff expectations while the current version of guilt aversion does not) seems worth exploring
in future research.23 A further explanation for the prominence of promise SQ&AP is that a promise has (and is expected
to have) a commitment value which is independent of its impact on the expectation of the consumer (as in Ellingsen and
Johannesson, 2004, for instance), or that experts have an expectations-unrelated aversion against lying (Gneezy, 2005). As
it should be expected, our data cannot give a clear-cut answer to the question which of these alternative explanations for
promise-keeping is responsible for the prominence of the promise SQ&AP. More generally, we consider it unlikely that a sin-
gle theory is able to explain all instances of promise-keeping across contexts and subjects and we think that more research
is needed to ﬁnd out which of the mentioned motivational stories is empirically relevant for which fraction of subjects in
which context.24
Concerning the second device to inﬂuence the behavior of experts, we fail to conﬁrm the behavioral relevance of allowing
for a money-burning option of the consumer. The theoretical prediction here would have been that giving the consumer an
opportunity to burn money changes the behavior of the expert even when the option is not used. That this prediction is
not supported by our data is perhaps not surprising – after all it relies on iterated forward induction and thereby requires
many layers of mutual knowledge of rationality. Perhaps more surprising is the observation that the milder hypothesis
(requiring only two layers of mutual knowledge of rationality) that consumers who burn more money are treated better is
not supported by the data either.25
Our overall conclusion is that promises are behaviorally relevant but that their impact cannot be explained by the theory
of ‘simple guilt’ alone, and that money burning is less powerful in practice than in theory.
23 A previous version of this paper contains a model of guilt based on behavior expectations.
24 Some important steps in that direction have already been done – for instance, by Vanberg (2008) who presents a nice experimental design intended
to discriminate between the expectation- and the commitment-based explanation for promise-keeping, and by Ellingsen et al. (2010) who directly test the
expectation-based explanation.
25 This is, however, somewhat in line with earlier ﬁndings that the size of player 1’s outside option in ‘lost wallet games’ does not affect player 2’s
response behavior; see Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2000), Cox et al. (2010).
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A.1. Formal results for the baseline game, ΓB
Consider the baseline game, ΓB . Let σe = (στ,η|θ )(τ ,η,θ)∈{l,h}3 denote a mixed strategy of the expert, where στ,η|θ stands
for the probability with which the expert provides quality Cτ and charges price Pη , given the consumer has accepted and
has problem θ . Similarly, let αa = (ατ,η|θ )(τ ,η,θ)∈{l,h}3 denote the consumer’s initial (ﬁrst-order) belief about the expert’s
behavior in case of acceptance, where ατ,η|θ stands for the probability the consumer assigns to the event that the expert
provides quality Cτ and charges price Pη , given she has problem θ . Finally, let βa = (βτ,η|θ )(τ ,η,θ)∈{l,h}3 denote the expert’s
expectation of αa , conditional on the consumer’s acceptance.
We start by proving formal versions of the three observations in the main text. For this purpose, let (τ ,η|θ) (τ ′, η′|θ)
stand for the statement “the expert prefers (τ ,η) over (τ ′, η′) in state θ”, and deﬁne the symmetric (∼) and the asymmetric
(
) relation similarly. Then:
Observation 1. For any βa and any γ , (l, l|l) 
 (h, l|l) and (l,h|l) 
 (h,h|l).
Proof. The proof is by contradiction. First suppose (l, l|l) (h, l|l). Then
Pl − Cl − γ max
{
Eβa (πc) − (V − Pl),0
}
 Pl − Ch − γ max
{
Eβa (πc) − (V − Pl),0
} ⇔ Ch − Cl  0,
which is in violation of the assumption Ch > Cl . The proof for (l,h|l) 
 (h,h|l) is similar. 
Observation 2. For any βa and any γ , [(l, l|l) 
 (l,h|l) ⇔ (h, l|h) 
 (h,h|h)] and [(l,h|l) 
 (l, l|l) ⇔ (h,h|h) 
 (h, l|h)]. Furthermore,
for any βa, [(l, l|l) ∼ (l,h|l) ⇔ (h, l|h) ∼ (h,h|h)], and (l, l|l) ∼ (l,h|l) for at most a single value of γ .
Proof. The ﬁrst part of the statement follows from the fact that Eβa (πc) does not depend on the realizations of η and θ
and that – for the case where the consumer’s problem is solved – her actual payoff does not depend on the realization
of those variables either. Thus, when the expert decides to solve the consumer’s problem then charging Pl instead of Ph
involves exactly the same costs and beneﬁt in both states; in both states the cost is material and amounts to Ph − Pl , and in
both states the beneﬁt consists in reducing the psychological cost by γ max{Eβa (πc)− (V − Ph),0} γ (Ph − Pl). This latter
consideration also implies that for each βa , indifference is consistent with at most a single value of γ : for Eβa (πc) > V − Ph
it is consistent with γ = (Ph − Pl)/[Eβa (πc) − V + Ph]; and for Eβa (πc) V − Ph it is inconsistent with any γ  0. 
Observation 3 (part a). For any βa and any γ , (l, l|h) (l,h|h) ⇒ (h,h|h) 
 (l, l|h).
Proof. First note that (l, l|h)  (l,h|h) is equivalent to Pl − Cl − γ max{Eβa (πc) + Pl,0}  Ph − Cl − γ max {Eβa (πc) + Ph}.
Now Eβa (πc)  qlV − Ph ∀βa; furthermore, qlV − Ph + Pl  0, by assumption (3). Thus, Eβa (πc) + Ph  Eβa (πc) + Pl  0,
implying that the above inequality reduces to γ  1. Now suppose (l, l|h)  (h,h|h), in violation of the claim. Then Pl −
Cl − γ max {Eβa (πc) + Pl,0} Ph − Ch − γ max {Eβa (πc) − V + Ph,0} Ph − Ch − γ [Eβa (πc)− V + Ph]. Using again the fact
that Eβa (πc) + Pl  0 we get Ch − Cl  Ph − Pl + γ [V − Ph + Pl] or [(Ch − Cl) − (Ph − Pl)]/[V − (Ph − Pl)] γ . But, since
V > Ch − Cl by assumption (1), the LHS of this inequality is strictly smaller than 1, contradicting γ  1. 
Observation 3 (part b). For any βa and any γ , (h, l|h) (h,h|h) ⇒ (h, l|h) 
 (l, l|h) (l,h|h).
Proof. From the proof of Observation 2 we know that (h, l|h)  (h,h|h) requires Eβa (πc) > V − Ph and γ  (Ph −
Pl)/[Eβa (πc)−V + Ph] 1, where the last inequality follows from Eβa (πc) V − Pl ∀βa . First suppose (l, l|h) (h, l|h), in vi-
olation of the claim. Then Pl−Cl−γ max{Eβa (πc)+ Pl,0} = Pl−Cl−γ [Eβa (πc)+ Pl] Pl−Ch−γ max{Eβa (πc)−V + Pl,0} =
Pl − Ch , where the former equality follows from Eβa (πc) > V − Ph > 0 and the latter (again) from Eβa (πc) V − Pl ∀βa . But
then Ch −Cl  γ [Eβa (πc)+ Pl] = γ [Eβa (πc)− V + Ph]+γ (V − Ph + Pl) Ph − Pl +γ (V − Ph + Pl), where the last inequality
follows from the lower bound on γ mentioned at the start of the proof. But 0 Ph − Ch + Cl + γ (V − Ph) + (γ − 1)Pl is
inconsistent with Ph > Ch , Cl  0, V  Ph , γ  1 and Pl  0. Next suppose (l,h|h) 
 (l, l|h), in violation of the claim. Then
Ph − Cl −γ max{Eβa (πc)+ Ph,0} > Pl − Cl −γ max{Eβa (πc)+ Pl,0} ⇔ Ph − Pl > γ (Ph − Pl), where the ⇔ follows from the
lower bound on E(πc) given at the start of the proof (which implies that the max operator selects the ﬁrst term in {.} on
both sides of the inequality). But γ < 1 violates the lower bound on γ given at the start of the proof. 
Observations 1, 2, 3a and 3b together imply the following result:
Lemma 1. Generically, the expert’s behavior in the subgame starting after the consumer has accepted is of one of the following three
types:
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• type-2 behavior: the expert provides the low quality if the consumer has the minor problem and the high quality if the consumer
has the major problem, and he charges the price for the high quality in both states;
• type-3 behavior: the expert provides the low quality if the consumer has the minor problem and the high quality if the consumer
has the major problem, and he charges the price for the low quality in both states.
Given Lemma 1, the requirement that in equilibrium beliefs of all orders have to be consistent with actual behavior, and
the facts that (i) type-1 behavior implies Eαa (πc) = Eβa (πc) = qlV − Ph , (ii) type-2 behavior implies Eαa (πc) = Eβa (πc) =
V − Ph , and (iii) type-3 behavior implies Eαa (πc) = Eβa (πc) = V − Pl , it is straightforward to prove the following results26:
Proposition 1a. Generically the baseline game ΓB admits three types of PBE:
• in type-1 equilibria the consumer rejects and the expert exhibits type-1 behavior in case of acceptance;
• in type-2 equilibria the consumer accepts and the expert exhibits type-2 behavior in case of acceptance;
• in type-3 equilibria the consumer accepts and the expert exhibits type-3 behavior in case of acceptance.
The bounds for existence of each of the three types of PBE are shown in Fig. 2.
Proof. We derive the bounds for existence of each of the three types of equilibria in turn.
Bounds for type-1 equilibrium: In a type-1 equilibrium Eαa (πc) = Eβa (πc) = qlV − Ph . We have to show that for
this expectation type-1 behavior (as described in Lemma 1) is optimal for the expert for any γ  (Ch − Cl)/qlV ,
while it is suboptimal outside this range. For θ = l Observation 1 implies that we only need to show that for the
above expectation and for guilt-sensitivity parameters in the given range we have (l,h, |l)  (l, l|l). Suppose not. Then
Pl − Cl − γ max {Eβa (πc) − (V − Pl),0} = Pl − Cl > Ph − Cl − γ max {Eβa (πc) − (V − Ph),0} = Ph − Cl , which violates the
assumption that Ph  Pl . For θ = h the fact that (l,h|l)  (l, l|l) (together with Observation 2) implies that we need
to check that (l,h|h)  (h,h|h) and (l,h|h)  (l, l|h) hold for parameters within the stated range and that at least
one of these restrictions is violated for parameters outside the range. First note that (l,h|h)  (h,h|h) is equivalent to
Ph − Cl − γ max {qlV − Ph − (−Ph),0} = Ph − Cl − γ qlV  Ph − Ch − γ max {qlV − Ph − (V − Ph),0} = Ph − Ch . Thus,
this inequality is equivalent to Ch − Cl  γ qlV or γ  (Ch − Cl)/qlV . Next note that (l,h|h)  (l, l|h) ⇔ [Ph − Cl −
γ max {qlV − Ph − (−Ph),0}  Pl − Cl − γ max {qlV − Ph − (−Pl),0}] ⇔ [Ph − Cl − γ qlV  Pl − Cl − γ (qlV − Ph + Pl)] ⇔
[Ph − Pl  γ (Ph − Pl)] ⇔ γ  1, which is satisﬁed because γ  (Ch − Cl)/qlV and V > (Ch − Cl)/ql , by assumption (3).
Bounds for type-2 equilibrium: In a type-2 equilibrium Eαa (πc) = Eβa (πc) = V − Ph . We have to show that for this
expectation type-2 behavior (as described in Lemma 1) is optimal for the expert for any γ  (Ch − Cl)/V , while it is
suboptimal outside this range. For θ = l the check is exactly the same as for type-1 equilibrium. For θ = h we need to
check that (h,h|h) (l,h|h) and (h,h|h) (l, l|h) hold for parameters within the stated range and that at least one of these
restrictions is violated for γ < (Ch − Cl)/V . First note that (h,h|h) (l,h|h) ⇔ [Ph − Ch − γ max {V − Ph − (V − Ph),0} 
Ph − Cl − γ max {V − Ph − (−Ph),0}] ⇔ [γ V  Ch − Cl] ⇔ γ  (Ch − Cl)/V . Next note that (h,h|h) (l, l|h) ⇔ [Ph − Ch −
γ max {V − Ph − (V − Ph),0}  Pl − Cl − γ max {V − Ph − (−Pl),0}] ⇔ γ [(V − Ph + Pl)  (Ch − Cl) − (Ph − Pl)] ⇔ γ 
[(Ch − Cl) − (Ph − Pl)]/[V − (Ph − Pl)], which is ﬁne because (Ch − Cl)/V  [(Ch − Cl) − (Ph − Pl)]/[V − (Ph − Pl)], by
assumption (1).
Bounds for type-3 equilibrium: In a type-3 equilibrium Eαa (πc) = Eβa (πc) = V − Pl . We have to show that for this
expectation type-3 behavior (as described in Lemma 1) is optimal for the expert for any γ  1, while it is suboptimal
outside this range. For θ = l we need only to check that for this expectation and those values of γ we have (l, l|l) 
(l,h|l) ⇔ [Pl − Cl −γ max {V − Pl − (V − Pl),0} Ph − Cl −γ max {V − Pl − (V − Ph),0}] ⇔ γ  1. For θ = h Observation 2
and Observation 3 together imply that we need only to check (h, l|h) (h,h|h) ⇔ [Pl − Ch − γ max {V − Pl − (V − Pl),0}
Ph − Ch − γ max {V − Pl − (V − Ph),0}] ⇔ γ  1. 
Proposition 1b. For any γ > (Ch − Cl)/Ph only type-2 and type-3 equilibria are consistent with forward-induction reasoning in ΓB .
Proof. Suppose the consumer accepts. If she is rational, she must believe that the expert behaves in a way that implies a
material payoff of at least 0 for her. Thus, if the expert believes that the consumer is rational, then he infers Eαa (πc) 0
from her acceptance. Thus, Eβa (πc)  0. The proof that Eβa (πc)  0 together with γ > (Ch − Cl)/Ph implies (h,h|h) 

(l,h|h) is by contradiction. Suppose (l,h|h) (h,h|h). Then Ph − Cl − γ max {Eβa (πc) + Ph,0} = Ph − Cl − γ [Eβa (πc)+ Ph]
Ph − Ch − γ max {Eβa (πc) − (V − Ph),0}, which is equivalent to Ch − Cl  γ [Eβa (πc) + Ph] − γ max {Eβa (πc) − (V − Ph),0}.
Now the RHS of this inequality is minimal when Eβa (πc) > V − Ph . For this case the inequality reduces to γ  (Ch −
Cl)/V , which is inconsistent with V > Ph (by assumption (1)) and γ > (Ch − Cl)/Ph . The proof that the two inequalities
26 For completeness we mention the existence of two non-generic pure-strategy PBE, one in which the expert always provides the appropriate quality
and charges accordingly and one in which he always provides the appropriate quality and always charges the “wrong” price. However, since each of those
equilibria exists only at a single point [the former at γ = 1/ql , the latter at γ = 1/(1− ql)] we ignore them in the sequel.
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 (l, l|h) is again by contradiction. Suppose (l, l|h)  (h, l|h). Then Pl − Cl −
γ max {Eβa (πc) + Pl,0} = Pl − Cl − γ [Eβa (πc) + Pl]  Pl − Ch − γ max {Eβa (πc) − (V − Pl),0} = Pl − Ch , where the ﬁrst
equation is implied by Eβa (πc) 0 and the second by Eβa (πc) V − Pl . Thus, we get (Ch − Cl)/[Eβa (πc) + Pl] γ , which
is inconsistent with Eβa (πc) 0, Ph > Pl , and γ > (Ch − Cl)/Ph . 
A.2. Formal results for the game with promise option, ΓP
Proposition 2a. Consider the game ΓP . Suppose promises act as equilibrium selection devices. Then for any γ ∈ [(Ch − Cl)/V , (Ch −
Cl)/qlV ] the expert makes promise SQ and exhibits type-2 behavior after acceptance. For parameter values outside this range the
promise is arbitrary and has no effect on expert’s behavior.
Proof. Under the assumptions that promises are believed (and believed to be believed) if and only if believing in the
promise is consistent with equilibrium, promises NO and SQ&AP never have any effect, the former because it has no content
and the latter because generically there is no PBE in which the expert provides suﬃcient quality and charges the price for
the quality provided in both states.27 By contrast, the impact of promises SQ and AP on the expert’s behavior in the subgame
starting after the consumer has accepted depends on the realization of γ . For γ < (Ch −Cl)/V and for γ ∈ ((Ch −Cl)/qlV ,1)
those promises have no effect because there is a unique prediction in those ranges anyway – see Fig. 2. For γ  1 they have
no effect either; for SQ this follows from the fact that the expert provides suﬃcient quality in both equilibria and for AP
from the observation that the expert charges correctly in none of them. Promises AP and SQ have an effect in the range
γ ∈ [(Ch − Cl)/V , (Ch − Cl)/qlV ]. In this range SQ selects the type-2 equilibrium, while AP selects the type-1 equilibrium;
since type-1 equilibrium involves rejection while type-2 equilibrium entails proﬁtable trade, the model predicts that the
expert makes promise SQ and that he exhibits type-2 behavior after acceptance.28 For other values of γ promises SQ and
AP have no effect and our model makes no prediction regarding which promise is actually made. 
Proposition 2b. Suppose promises are believed and believed to be believed in game ΓP . Then the expert either makes promise
SQ or promise AP and each of those promises is accepted by the consumer. The expert’s behavior after acceptance of promise
p ∈ {NO,AP, SQ, SQ&AP} is as shown in Fig. 3.
Proof. Let αp denote the consumer’s (initial) belief about the expert’s behavior when he has made promise p ∈ {NO, SQ , AP,
SQ&AP} and the consumer has accepted. Also let βp denote the expert’s expectation of αp conditional on the consumer’s
acceptance after the promise p has been made. Then
EαNO(πc) = EβNO(πc) = qlV − Ph,
EαSQ (πc) = EβSQ (πc) = V − Ph,
EαSQ&AP (πc) = EβSQ&AP (πc) = V − ql Pl − (1− ql)Ph,
while the expectation under the promise AP depends on the price-vector. It is the same as that for SQ for “overtreatment”
price-vectors (deﬁned by Ph − Ch > Pl − Cl), it is the same as that for SQ&AP for “equal mark-up” price-vectors (deﬁned by
Ph − Ch = Pl − Cl), and it is
EαAPUT (πc) = EβAPUT (πc) = qlV − Pl
for “undertreatment” price-vectors (deﬁned by Ph −Ch < Pl −Cl). Given those expectations it is straightforward to show that
the expert’s behavior in the subgame starting when the consumer has accepted after promise p has been made is as shown
in Fig. 3.29 First notice that the promise NO yields rejection if it is believed. Thus, the expert will never use this promise if
he expects that promises are believed. Next notice that the promise SQ strictly dominates the promise SQ&AP for any γ > 0.
To see this, ﬁrst note that both promises yield acceptance by the consumer. Furthermore, for γ > 1/ql the promise SQ&AP
implies a lower price for the consumer than SQ at a material cost for the expert, but exactly the same amount of guilt; and
for γ  1/ql both promises yield exactly the same behavior (and thereby also the same material payoff for the expert), but
SQ&AP yields a higher amount of guilt than SQ . Thus, promise SQ&AP will never be made if it is expected to be believed.
So we are left with the promises in the set {SQ,AP}. Here, the comparison is more complicated; it depends on the kind of
price-vector under which transactions (potentially) take place, on the magnitude of V and potentially also on γ .30 
27 For completeness we mention that there exists such an equilibrium for a single realization of γ , namely for γ = 1/ql . However, since this equilibrium
exists only at a single point we ignore it in the sequel.
28 Our discussion assumes that there is some uncertainty about the expectation and behavior of the other side of the market when there is equilibrium
multiplicity.
29 In the ﬁgure APUT stands for the promise AP under an undertreatment price-vector. The behavior after the promise AP under an overtreatment vector
is the same as after promise SQ , and the behavior under an equal mark-up vector is the same as after SQ&AP.
30 Under equal mark-up price-vectors SQ dominates AP for all V and all γ (because AP yields the same payoff expectations as SQ&AP for this case); under
overtreatment price-vectors the two promises are equivalent to each other (because they yield the same payoff expectations for the consumer); and under
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Proposition 3. Consider the game ΓM. For any γ ∈ ((Ch − Cl)/(Ph + x),1) the path predicted by (iterated) forward-induction
reasoning is unique and it involves full eﬃciency without money burning.
Proof. We start by showing that – for guilt-sensitivity parameters in the range ((Ch − Cl)/(Ph + x),1) – for any
m ∈ M = {0, ,2, . . . , x} only type-2 behavior is consistent with the assumption of common knowledge of rationality.
To see this, ﬁrst suppose the consumer burns the maximal feasible amount x . If the expert is rational and believes in
the rationality of the consumer when he has to decide in the subgame starting after the amount x has been burned,
then he infers that Eαx (πc)  x . Therefore, Eβx (πc)  x .31 We now show that an expert with such an expecta-
tion necessarily provides Ch in state h for any γ > (Ch − Cl)/(Ph + x). By the arguments given earlier it is suﬃcient
to show that (h,h|h) 
 (l,h|h) under those conditions. The proof is by contradiction. Suppose (l,h|h)  (h,h|h). Then
Ph − Cl − γ max {Eβ(πc) − (−Ph),0}  Ph − Ch − γ max {Eβ(πc) − (V − Ph),0}. Now, since Eβ(πc)  x this is equivalent
to Ch − Cl  γ [Eβ(πc) + Ph] − γ max {E(πc) − (V − Ph),0}  γ [E(πc) + Ph]  γ [Ph + x]. Thus, γ  (Ch − Cl)/(Ph + x),
which is inconsistent with the restriction on γ we started with. Taking the same logic one step further, suppose now the
consumer burns the amount (x− 1) . Then the expert infers from that that Eα(x−1) (πc)− (x− 1)  V − Ph − x . This is so
because – if both the expert and the consumer accept the above reasoning – they believe that by burning the amount x
the consumer can guarantee a material payoff of at least V − Ph − x . Hence, burning (x− 1) is consistent with common
knowledge of rationality only if this does not yield less. Thus, Eα(x−1) (πc) V − Ph −   x , where the last inequality is
implied by our assumption on x.32 Now, since Eβ(x−1) (πc) x , we can apply the same arguments as above to show that
the expert treats the consumer appropriately, even when she burns only m = (x − 1) . Furthermore, for m = (x − 2) we
get – by the same argument – the inequality E(πc) − (x − 2)  V − Ph − (x − 1) ⇔ E(πc)  V − Ph −   x and thus
again appropriate treatment. Proceeding this way further we get to the prediction that for any m ∈ M (even for m = 0!) the
expert treats the consumer appropriately. Anticipating appropriate treatment for any m ∈ M , the consumer decides not to
burn any money (that is, to choose m = 0). 
Appendix B. Instructions
INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE EXPERIMENT
Thank you for participating in this experiment. Please do not talk to any other participant until the experiment is over.
General remarks
The aim of this experiment is to explore choice behavior. During this experiment you and the other participants will be
asked to make decisions. By making these decisions you will earn money. Your earnings will depend on your decisions and
the decisions of the other participants. You will receive your payment anonymously and in cash. All participants receive the
same information about the rules of the game, including the costs and payoffs for certain actions. Neither you nor anybody
else will ever be informed about the identity of the participants you interacted with. No one will be informed about the
payments to other participants. Please consider all expressions as gender neutral.
2 roles and 24 rounds
This experiment consists of 24 rounds, each of the 24 rounds consists of the same sequence of decisions. This means that
the same situation will be simulated 24 times in a row. There are 2 roles in this experiment: Player A and Player B. At the
beginning of the experiment you will be randomly assigned to one of these two roles. On the ﬁrst screen of the experiment
you will see which role you are assigned to. This role stays the same throughout the experiment.
A Player A always interacts with a Player B. In each of the 24 rounds you will be randomly matched to a player of the
other type, i.e. the pairs of participants, consisting of a Player A and a Player B, will be determined randomly in each round.
In each round you face the following situation:
Player B has one of two possible problems, either Problem I or Problem II. Both problems are equally likely. The problem
of a Player B is only known to the Player A who currently interacts with him – Player B himself does not know his own
problem. Player A can now sell a solution to Player B, either Solution I or Solution II. Solution I costs Player A 0 points,
Solution II costs him 30 points. For this solution, he can either charge the “Price of Solution I” or the “Price of Solution II”
undertreatment price-vectors the comparison depends upon whether AP is accepted or not (for Pl  ql V it is accepted, for Pl > ql V it is rejected) and in
case of acceptance, on whether γ is larger or smaller than (Ch − Cl)/(ql V + Ph − Pl) (in the former case the two promises yield the same behavior and
the same amount of guilt, in the latter the behavior or the amount of guilt differs).
31 We omit the subscript on the variables α and β when there is little scope for confusion.
32 If the assumption on x is violated, then the arguments in the main text still work when we replace the restriction γ > (Ch − Cl)/(Ph + x) by the –
then more demanding – restriction γ > (Ch − Cl)/(Ph − ).
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solutions and prices as desired, i.e. if Player A chooses e.g. Solution I, he can either charge the “Price of Solution I” or the
“Price of Solution II”.
The solution sold by Player A to Player B can either be suﬃcient or not. Solution II is always suﬃcient and solves the
problem of Player B in any case. Solution I only solves Problem I. The following table shows when a solution is suﬃcient
and when it is not:
Player A chooses ⇓ Player B has ⇒ Problem I Problem II
Solution I suﬃcient not suﬃcient
Solution II suﬃcient suﬃcient
It follows that a solution is not suﬃcient if Player B has Problem II and Player A chooses Solution I. Player A’s earnings
do not depend on whether the solution is suﬃcient or not. However, Player B receives 100 points if and only if the solution
was suﬃcient. If the solution is not suﬃcient Player B receives no points in this round. Still, the price Player A charges for
his solution has to be paid by Player B in any case.
Sequence of a round:
Explanations referring to the interaction price only apply in treatments I and PI, and explanations referring to promises only apply
in treatments P and PI.
1. Player A and Player B get to know the “Price of Solution I” and the “Price of Solution II”, which are randomly determined
for this round.
2. Player B has then 2 possibilities: He either quits this round and does not continue to play. Then both players receive
no points for this round and they wait until the next round starts, in which the players will be randomly rematched.
Or he accepts to interact with Player A.
3. Player A gets to know Player B’s problem (either Problem I or Problem II). He now chooses a solution (either Solution I
or Solution II) and charges a price for this solution (either the “Price of Solution I” or the “Price of Solution II”). The
payoff of Player A is as follows:
+ price, charged from Player B (“Price of Solution I” or “Price of Solution II”)
− costs of the solution sold (0 or 30 points)
= payoff for Player A in this round
Player B will neither be informed about the problem he had, nor will he be informed about the solution Player A chose.
He will only be told the price he has to pay to Player A and whether the solution chosen by Player A was suﬃcient or not.
The payoff of Player B is as follows:
+ 100 or 0 points (100 if the solution was suﬃcient, 0 if not)
− price charged by Player A (“Price of Solution I” or “Price of Solution II”)
= payoff for Player B in this round
At the beginning of the experiment you receive an initial endowment of 200 points. With this endowment you can cover
losses that might occur during some rounds. Also, losses can be covered with gains from other rounds. At the end of the
experiment your initial endowment and your payoffs from each round will be summed up. This amount will be converted
into cash money using the following exchange rate
80 points = 1 Euro
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